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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U T A H 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
— vs. — 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Brief of Felt Syndicate, Xnc* 
Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of this brief, we will refer to the 
parties as Felt, Hartford, Cassady, Title Company and 
Prudential which are the respective designations used 
in the transcript and in the briefs of counsel heretofore 
filed in this consolidated proceeding. In addition, we 
will use the transcript and record designations set forth 
on page 3 of Hartford's brief. 
Case No. 8736 
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By reason of the consolidation of these cases, the 
facts have been rather completely stated in the briefs 
submitted by Hartford, Prudential and the Title Com-
pany. Due to the particular problem applicable to the 
appeal of Felt, some duplication, we feel, is necessary. 
Felt, during the early par t of 1950, acquired a tract 
of land in Salt Lake County, and platted and subdivided 
this land prior to July 19th, 1950, under the name of 
"Morningside Heights ." (Ex. Pr . 2.) On July 19th, 
1950, Felt entered into a written agreement with Cas-
sady which generally provided that Cassady would 
cause to be constructed one hundred homes on the lots 
of the subdivision (Ex. Pr. 2). The time within which 
Cassady was to complete the construction of the homes 
and the maximum cost for the construction of each home 
was specifically treated in this agreement (Ex. Pr . 2). 
Additional provisions recited that out of the amounts 
derived from the sale of the homes and lots, Cassady 
would receive its construction costs, Felt would receive 
reimbursement for land and street improvements to-
gether with its miscellaneous administrative and legal 
expenses, and any net profit would then be divided 
equally between Felt and Cassady (Ex. Pr . 2). 
I t was further provided on page 3 of the agreement 
of August 10th, 1950, and in the schedules thereto 
attached, that Felt would receive directly from the dis-
bursing agent specifically set forth amounts as "Fe l t 
Miscellaneous" funds (Ex. Pr . 8). I t has been stipulated 
that the amount which Felt was not paid on this miscel-
laneous account totaled $17,173.43 (Tr. 20). 
2 
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In May of 1950, Felt entered into an agreement 
with Wright-Wirthlin Company, a realtor in Salt Lake, 
to sell the one hundred homes in Morningside Heights 
(Ex. H-31). Prior to March 22, 1951, the Wright-Wirth-
lin Company had sold all of the homes and had due and 
owing it from Felt, $19,100.00 of the agreed sales com-
mission (Ex. H-31). On the 22nd day of March, 1951, 
Felt entered into an agreement entitled "Assignment 
and Agreement' ' wherein it was the announced intention 
of the parties to thereby "secure the said obligation" 
owing to Wright-Wirthlin, and Wright-Wirthlin, in 
consideration thereof, covenanted to "forego any action 
or immediate procedure' ' against Felt on the account 
(Ex. H-31). 
I t is pertinent to note also that by the agreement, 
Wright-Wirthlin did not credit the account due from 
Felt for amy sums not actually received by Wright-
Wirthlin, and it was expressly announced in paragraph 
(5) that nothing in the agreement should "be construed 
to waive or impair any right Wright-Wirthlin Company 
may have to the full and complete sum" owing to it by 
Felt (Ex. H-31). 
In its answer, Hartford interposed several defenses, 
none of which raised the issue that Felt was not the 
real party in interest as to the miscellaneous account, 
and at no time during the two pretrials was an issue 
framed or a defense made that Felt was not the real 
party in interest as to the miscellaneous account. 
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At the conclusion of the trial in the Lower Court, 
the respondent here, Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company, for the first time moved to strike a portion 
of the claimed damages of Felt which related to the 
account labelled "Felt Miscellaneous Fund" on the 
ground that the appellant was not the real party in 
interest thereto. This motion was granted by the Lower 
Court, and the sum of $14,761.80, together with interest 
at 6%, was thereupon excluded from the judgment 
awarded to this appellant. The appeal here taken by 
Felt is based upon the Lower Court's ruling on the 
aforesaid motion. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS—APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
POINT I. 
AN ASSIGNOR WHO HAS ASSIGNED A CONTRACT 
RIGHT TO HIS CREDITOR FOR SECURITY PURPOSES 
ONLY IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN AN ACTION 
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT RIGHT. 
POINT II. 
A MOTION TO ABATE OR DISMISS A CAUSE OF 
ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS 
NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS WAIVED BY 
DEFENDANT IF INTERPOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT I. 
AN ASSIGNOR WHO HAS ASSIGNED A CONTRACT 
RIGHT TO HIS CREDITOR FOR SECURITY PURPOSES 
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ONLY IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN AN ACTION 
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT RIGHT. 
On the 22nd of March, 1951, Felt, the appellant 
here, was indebted to Wright-Wirthlin Company for 
real estate commissions on the sale of the lots in the 
subdivision in the sum of $19,100.00. Felt contends that 
the money with which to discharge this just obligation 
was not available because Hartford's principal, Cassady, 
had not fulfilled its construction contract, thereby pro-
hibiting the disbursement of the stage of completion 
advances. 
An "Assignment and Agreement" was entered into 
between Wright-Wirthlin and Felt on the 22nd of 
March, 1951, from which it is evident the following facts 
then existed (Ex. H-31): 
1. That Wright-Wirthlin had theretofore sold 
all of the 100 lots in the subdivision pursuant 
to the contract between Wright-Wirthlin and 
Felt. 
2. That the contract commission agreed to be 
paid to Wright-Wirthlin from Felt was in the 
total sum of $30,000.00. 
3. That there was then long past due and owing 
to Wright-Wirthlin from Felt, the total sum 
of $19,100.00. 
4. That Wright-Wirthlin was threatening Felt 
with court action to enforce payment of the 
commission due. (Para. 4, Ex. H. 31.) 
An inspection of the "Assignment and Agreement" 
discloses: 
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1. That the parties, by making the assignment 
of the "Fe l t Miscellaneous Fund , " intended 
only 
' ' . . . to secure the said obligation . . . " 
between Wright-Wirthlin and Felt. (See first 
recital, Ex. H-31.) 
2. That only 89.6% of the amounts received 
thereafter in the miscellaneous fund would be 
transferred to Wright-Wirthlin to apply on 
the obligation due from Felt. 
3. That the mere "ass ignment" of the amounts 
to become due the miscellaneous fund effected 
no reduction in the amount due from Felt to 
Wright-Wirthlin. (See para. 5, Ex. H-31). 
Consequently, Felt could only reduce its obli-
gation owing Wright-Wirthlin if and as dis-
bursements from the miscellaneous account 
were made. 
4. Felt at all times retained free from the 
assignment for security purposes, 10.4% of 
the miscellaneous account. 
5. Wright-Wirthlin, with its obligation due from 
Felt secured by the "Agreement and Assign-
ment ," agreed to withhold court action to 
collect the obligation (Para. 4, Ex. H-31). 
I t is of further probative value, in light of the law 
to be hereafter discussed, that Wright-Wirthlin re-as-
signed their interest in the miscellaneous account to Felt 
on the 20th of December, 1956, over three months prior 
to the date upon which the evidence was closed in this 
proceeding and over three months prior to the date 
upon which Hartford, for the first time, raised its 
defense that Felt was not the real party in interest to 
89.6% of the miscellaneous account. 
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May we repeat, that the Lower Court in its judg-
ment found that the "Fe l t Miscellaneous F u n d " was a 
proper portion of Felt's damages proximately arising 
from the many substantial contract breaches by Cassady, 
but further found that Felt was not the " rea l party in 
interest" as to 89.6% of the miscellaneous account. The 
lower court excluded $14,761.80 from the account, and 
awarded Felt judgment which included only the re-
maining 10.4% of the miscellaneous account. 
Felt 's position, initially, is that under the Utah 
Eules of Civil Procedure, it ivas the real party in interest 
as to the entire miscellaneous account even though a 
security assignment had been made to Wright-Wirthlin. 
Prior to the adoption of real party in interest 
statutes, the common law rule was that an assignee of 
a chose in action could only bring suit in the name of 
his assignor. See 39 Am. Jur. 871. One of the primary 
purposes for the adoption of the real party in interest 
statutes is to extend the right to maintain a suit to the 
assignee. (See 39 Am. Jur. 871). This extension of the 
right to maintain the action, however, does not, per se, 
bar the remedy of the beneficial assignor: 
" I t is often stated to be the general rule that 
the equitable owner of a claim sued upon may 
sue as the real party in interest . . . " (39 Am. 
Jur . 871.) 
Most text writers agree that real party in interest 
statutes are designed to authorize and allow those par-
ties who hold the beneficial interest but not the legal 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
title, to a document or chose or right, to maintain the 
action. The exceptions in the real party in interest 
statutes extend the right to sue to the holders of the 
legal title and do not remove the right of the equitable 
or beneficial owner to maintain the action. This inter-
pretation has been adopted by most courts, including 
the courts of Utah, as we shall later show. 39 Am. Jur. 
872. 
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
' ' Real Par ty in Interest. Every action shall 
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest; but an executor, administrator, guar-
dian, trustee of an express trust, a party with 
whom or in whose name a contract has been made 
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized 
by statute may sue in his own name without join-
ing with him the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so pro-
vides, an action for the use or benefit of another 
shall be brought in the name of the state of 
Utah . " (Emphasis ours) 
The intent of the foregoing rule seems evident from 
its plain provisions — this is, that those interested in 
the proceeding are the proper parties to bring the matter 
before the court. 
The foregoing construction has been placed on the 
rule in the State of Utah for many years and has been 
the subject of consideration before this court on numer-
ous occasions. 
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For example, it seems quite well established that 
beneficiaries under a trust may bring an action in their 
own names as the real parties in interest when they are 
to be benefited or directly concerned with the outcome 
of the proceeding. See Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 
et al., 76 Utah 372, wherein it was stated by this court: 
" I t will be noted (from the statute) that the 
right of certain fiduciaries to sue is an exception 
to the general mandate that every action must 
be brought in the name of the real party in 
interest. The privilege conferred upon the fidu-
ciaries to sue is permissive. Nothing in the sta-
tute prohibits the real party in interest from 
suing in his own name in any proper case JJ 
This court has further spoken on the subject in 
considering the status of a third party beneficiary. See 
M. H. Walker Electric Company vs. American Surety 
Company of New York, 60 Utah 435, wherein this court 
stated : 
'' This much, however, can be said with reason-
able assurance: That whenever it appears from 
a contract that there is a clear intent to benefit 
a third party, whether specifically named in the 
contract or not, such person, ordinarily, may sue 
in his own name for the enforcement thereof or 
for the benefits arising therefrom. This general 
proposition, we believe, is well sustained by the 
great preponderance of judicial opinion in the 
several states of the Union. ' ' 
Based upon the foregoing quoted rule and upon 
the decisions of this court, we deem it fairly well settled 
that it is not essential in maintaining an action that the 
9 
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bare legal title be fixed in the plaintiff. We deem it 
equally well settled that if the plaintiff is to ^e benefited 
from the results of the litigation, such plaintiff is a real 
party in interest in the proceeding. 
The facts here, without contradiction, disclose that 
Felt was indebted to Wright-Wirthlin in the sum of 
$19,100.00 prior to the execution of the " Agreement and 
Assignment" and that after the "Agreement and Assign-
ment" was executed and delivered to Wright-Wirthlin, 
Felt Syndicate was still obligated to Wright-Wirthlin 
in the same amount. The "Agreement and Assignment" 
did not therefore effect a discharge of the obligation due 
Wright-Wirthlin by Felt nor in any way result in a 
reduction of the obligation. The amount due Wright-
Wirthlin was a continuing obligation from the date of 
the "Agreement and Assignment" up to and including 
the date the lower court entered its judgment herein. 
Of further significance is the fact that both parties 
announced in the agreement that it was made only to 
secure the obligation due Wright-Wirthlin. As such, 
Felt was at all times directly pecuniarily interested 
in the miscellaneous account, for the collections, if any, 
on the miscellaneous account would directly affect Fel t ' s 
continuing obligation to Wright-Wirthlin. As such, Felt 
should be deemed to be the real party in interest to the 
entire miscellaneous account. 
We can see no significant difference between the 
interest of Felt in this miscellaneous account and the 
interest of the third party beneficiary in the Walker case, 
10 
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supra, nor in the interest of the beneficiaries in the trust 
before this court in the Salina Canyon Coal case, supra. 
A close analogy is set forth in the case of Dickey 
vs. Porter, et aL, 101 S.W. 586. In that case a plain-
tiff had secured a loan with the bank by assigning to 
the bank a tax bill. The court there held that the pledgor, 
the one who gave the security interest, was a real party 
in interest in the proceeding. In appropriate language 
the court there said, p. 593: 
" B y his note to the bank, the plaintiff became 
absolutely indebted to the bank, whether the lien 
was valid and enforceable or not. If he had per-
mitted that statute of limitation to run, and the 
tax bill should thereby have become valueless as 
a security, his obligation to the bank would have 
still remained absolute. The bank was taking no 
step to enforce the lien, and, having brought this 
suit, it is obvious that it (the assignor) was the 
plaintiff who was to be benefited or injured by 
the judgment rendered in this case. The general 
title to the tax bill remained in the plaintiff a t 
the date of the commencement of the suit, sub-
ject only to the lien of the bank." 
I t was further noted by the court in the case of 
Ball-Thrash & Co. v. McCormick, 78 S.E. 303, that a 
pledgor could maintain an action on a note and mortgage 
held by the pledgee and in so doing it quoted with ap-
proval the case of Wells vs. Wells, 53 Vt. 1, wherein that 
court said: 
" 'And here it is to be remarked that the fact 
that the note and mortgage were held by the 
defendants as collateral did not stand in the way 
of the orators proceeding either by suit at law 
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on the note or by foreclosure on the mortgage, if 
they deemed it for their interest to have the note 
or the mortgage, or both, enforced earlier than 
the defendants saw fit to proceed in that behalf. 
See Am. Law Rev Oct. 1880, p. 693. The court 
would see to it that the rights and interests of 
the pledgee were protected in reference to the 
collateral at the same time that the pledgor was 
acting in regard to his own existing reversionary 
interest in the pledge, by the proceeding to en-
force it, as against the debtor in the pledge.' The 
writer of the article in the American Law Review, 
referred to in that case, states the law to be that 
the pledgor has an interest in the thing deposited 
in pledge, and is not restricted to the remedy of 
tender or repayment, and the pledgee will be 
protected in his rights by an order that he shall 
be first paid out of the fund derived from the sale 
of the property pledged or its collection, if a 
note. ' ' 
May we further draw the court's attention to the 
fact that over three months prior to the close of the 
evidence in this proceeding all of the rights in the 
miscellaneous account assigned to Wright-Wirthlin had 
been re-assigned to Felt and consequently Felt has at 
all times since the 20th of December, 1956, been in a 
position to directly discharge the total obligation which 
Hartford has under its bond. 
Based upon the statute and the foregoing authori-
ties Felt respectfully submits that it is and at all times 
has been the real party in interest to the entire miscel-
laneous account, and that the lower court erred when 
it excluded the sum of $14,761.80, together with accrued 
interest, from the judgment awarded to Felt. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. 
A MOTION TO ABATE OR DISMISS A CAUSE OF 
ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS 
NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS WAIVED BY 
DEFENDANT IF INTERPOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
No defense was made in the answer filed by Hart-
ford that Felt was not the real party in interest to all 
of the miscellaneous account. Further, no motion was 
made between the date of the answer and the first pre-
trial that Felt was not the real party in interest as to 
the miscellaneous account, nor was such an issue raised 
at either of the two pretrial proceedings by Hartford. 
The first time that Hartford made mention that it relied 
on a defense that Felt was not the real party in interest 
to the miscellaneous account was at the close of Felt 's 
evidence. The lower court ruled in favor of Hartford 
upon the motion being made and excluded $14,761.80, 
which was 89.6% of the miscellaneous account, on the 
ground that as to this portion of the miscellaneous 
account, Felt was not the real party in interest. 
Felt contends that this affirmative defense of Hart-
ford's had been waived. 
I t is provided in Rule 8(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure tha t : 
" A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall 
admit or deny the averments upon which the 
adverse party relies . . . " 
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Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
" I n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfac-
tion, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, 
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense . . . " (Emphasis ours) 
And, further, Ride 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: 
"A party ivaives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may 
also be made by a later pleading, if one is per-
mitted, or by motion for judgment on the plead-
ings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) 
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks juris-
diction of the subject-matter, the court shall dis-
miss the action. 
The foregoing language of our rules seem clear 
and unambiguous and is designed to give proper and 
timely notice to a plaintiff of the defenses which he 
must be prepared to meet. I t further seems settled that 
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if affirmative defenses are not pleaded or interposed 
by a motion that they are thereby waived. 
Here, the record is uncontroverted that no defense 
was raised in the pleadings or interposed by a motion 
on behalf of Hartford that the plaintiff here was not 
the real party in interest to the entire miscellaneous 
account. Even during the two pretrials had before 
Judge Ellett, no issue was even mentioned by Hartford 
that it would defend upon the ground that Felt was not 
the real party in interest. Not until the close of Felt 's 
evidence was mention thereof made. 
We, therefore, believe that the plain language of 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is prop-
erly applicable and that by reason thereof Hartford 
waived its defenses and objections that Felt was not the 
real party in interest to the entire miscellaneous account. 
The foregoing rules are rules of essential justice 
for they permit parties who believe their rights are 
properly being pursued and represented to rely upon 
the rules as they are plainly written and there would 
seem to be no doubt here that if Hartford had properly 
raised the defense of real party in interest during the 
four years in which these proceedings have been before 
the court that Wright-Wirthlin could have come in and 
made itself a party plaintiff if the court had then 
granted Hartford's motion. I t is significant also to note 
that this Supreme Court has previously treated this 
problem in the case of Fritz v. The Western Union Tele-
graph Company and The Rio Grande Western Railway 
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Company, 25 Utah 263, 280, wherein the court had before 
it the timeliness of an objection made during the course 
of the trial that an assignee was not a real par ty in 
interest. This court therein stated that : 
" . . . this objection (that the plaintiff was not 
the real party in interest) was urged too late, 
and must be held to have been waived. "The ob-
jection that the plaintiff in an action is not the 
real party in interest, as required by the Code, 
when available by way of defense, must be raised 
by demurrer or answer, or it will be considered 
to have been waived.' 15 Enc. PL and P r a c , 713; 
Eev. St. sec 2966; Smith v. Hall, 67 N.Y. 50; 
Spooner v. Railroad Co., 115 N.Y. 30, 21 N.E. 
696; Trust Co. v. Brown, 59 Mo. App. 461 ." 
The spirit and intent of the Fritz case, supra, is 
plainly incorporated in the present Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and we respectfully submit that in face of the 
Rules and the Fritz case the lower court here has 
plainly erred in excluding $14,761.80 of the miscellaneous 
account due this plaintiff. 
ANSWER OF FELT SYNDICATE, INC., APPELLANT, 
TO THE BRIEF FILED BY HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, RESPONDENT. 
Special Note: This case was consolidated for ap-
pellate purposes with cases Nos. 8719 and 8720. The 
respondent here, Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company, has filed its consolidated brief in all of the 
cases mentioned. The remaining portion of this brief 
will, therefore, be devoted to answering the brief of 
Hartford. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
IN ANSWER TO HARTFORD B R I E F 
POINT I. 
FELT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR 
MATERIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOS. 18 AND 
20, ALL TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE NO 
SUBSTANTIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACTS BY 
FELT, ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
1. The Lack of Funds Was Due to Cassady's 
Breaches and Not to Any Alleged Substantial Breach 
by Felt. 
2. The Court's Finding that the Assignment of the 
Miscellaneous Account Due Felt Was Not a Substantial 
Breach of the Contracts is Supported By the Evidence. 
3. Hartford Was Allowed an Offset for Fel t ' s 
Failure to Provide a Power Connection to Cassady and 
the Finding By the Court That Felt 's Failure to Supply 
Electrical Power Was of No Consequence is Supported 
By the Record. 
4. Hartford Alleges That Cassady Was Not Reim-
bursed For Extras But the Record Would Not Support 
the Award For Other Extras. 
POINT II . 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPRO-
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MISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL ALLEGED 
PRIOR BREACHES OF CONTRACT BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
POINT I I I . 
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 
1951, COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED 
BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL. 
POINT IV. 
FAILURE TO PAY FRANCHISE TAXES AFTER A 
FOREIGN CORPORATION CEASES TO DO BUSINESS 
IN UTAH WILL NOT BAR IT FROM THEREAFTER 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION IN UTAH COURTS. 
ARGUMENT 
In its brief, Hartford has totally ignored the oft 
repeated appellate rule that a successful plaintiff is 
entitled to have this court consider all of the evidence 
and every fair inference to be derived therefrom in the 
light most favorable to him. (Beck v. Jeppsen, 1 Utah 
2d, 127, 262 P. 2d 760; Cutler Association vs. Be Jay 
Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 Pac. 2d 700.) After attacking 
the trial court 's findings with controverted evidence 
gleaned merely from Cassady, Hartford 's bond prin-
cipal who was charged with supervision of the project, 
Hartford proceeds to interpret the evidence to exonerate 
its principal from fault concerning the project's failure. 
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From this erroneous basis, Hartford then places the 
blame on Felt and Prudential Federal and applies 
general principles of law to demonstrate error in the 
lower court. 
The complete absence in Hartford's brief of an 
analysis of the record to demonstrate that the judgment 
of the lower court was supported by substantial evi-
dence graphically indicates the absence of substance in 
Hartford's position here. It is well settled by this court 
that the findings and conclusions of the lower court, if 
supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed 
on appeal. The foregoing is the only issue before this 
court insofar as Hartford's affirmative position is 
concerned. 
POINT I. 
FELT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR 
MATERIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOS. 18 AND 
20, ALL TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE 
NO SUBSTANTIAL BREACHES OF THE CON-
TRACTS BY FELT, ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
(Note: Felt adopts here the applicable portions of 
Points I and II argued by the able counsel for 
Prudential, in their brief. In addition Felt sets 
forth the following answer to Hartford.) 
1. The Lack of Funds Was Due to Cassady's Breaches 
and Not to Any Alleged Substantial Breach by Felt. 
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Hartford misinterprets the significance of Finding 
No. 18, which is as follows: 
"Any delay in disbursing the mortgage pro-
ceeds by Prudential at the commencement of 
work in the summer of 1950 on the Morningside 
Heights project was caused by Cassady prema-
turely commencing work on the project before the 
execution, delivery and recording of mortgages 
executed by the veteran borrowers. Cassady 
knew that Prudential would not disburse the 
mortgage proceeds until mortgages were properly 
executed and recorded. The time lag thereby 
occasioned was the direct and immediate result 
of Cassady's own action in commencing construc-
tion work before mortgage funds were available 
under the terms of said several contracts. Cas-
sady assumed this risk of his own volition and 
choice." 
The purpose of this finding is not, as Hartford 
would infer, that Cassady was obliged to await the 
recordation of the final mortgage of the applying vet-
erans, but merely that Cassady knew of the conditions 
of obtaining reimbursement but chose to disregard the 
interests of all parties and continue construction accord-
ing to his own whim. 
By his own testimony, Cassady knew that the suc-
cess of the entire project depended upon the loans being 
made after mortgages were recorded. (T. 299). He was 
made fully aware of the fact that continued construction 
was contingent upon sales being made, mortgages being 
recorded and delivery being made to the purchasers 
when the first disbursal was made in August, 1950. (T. 
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262). He checked the records of sales and the progress 
of financing of the individual houses every day at the 
Felt Syndicate offices. (T. 322) Only for the first thirty-
day period was the sales program unsynchronized with 
the construction program and Cassady was informed of 
this so that he could exercise his own judgment as to 
which lot to work upon. (T. 321-322) After this short 
period, the sales program was brought into line with 
construction. (T. 348) Cassady recognized that in a 
project of this type it is necessary for a contractor to 
invest considerable capital in order to efficiently operate 
during the period preceding the commencement of 
progress payments. (E. 295) Despite the knowledge that 
he did not have sufficient funds to support a program 
of this type, Cassady chose to work on houses which 
were not yet sold rather than to aid all parties in obtain-
ing the funds which he knew would be available from 
loans made on houses which were sold. I t is significant 
to also note that not a single dwelling was ever com-
pleted by Cassady even though $725,735.27 was paid to 
him or in his behalf for actual contraction costs. (Ex. 
F . 10) 
When the mortgages were recorded, an inspection 
was made of the homes to determine the extent of their 
completion and thereafter, funds were disbursed ac-
cordingly. (T. 366) 
I t is undoubtedly true that in order to complete the 
project in the quickest and most inexpensive manner, 
the work was planned to move forward on a wholesale 
basis. However, the record shows that innumerable 
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delays in construction caused deterioration of the com-
pleted work (T. 153-155, Ex. F-25), that sales previously 
made were cancelled (T. 39, 62, 323), and that in some 
homes, even the preliminary work failed to pass inspec-
tion (Ex. F-24). In a letter written as late as June 13th, 
1951, Cassady wrote to one of his subcontractors (Ex. 
H-33): 
" I have had numerous complaints from you 
regarding the lack of materials available on the 
job. In this I concur in that at times we have 
had shortages of various items. However, at no 
time has there ever been a material shortage 
which would ever necessitate the laying-off of 
men nor prevented the hiring of additional men 
if the ivork were progressing systematically. This 
has been explained to you in detail ." (Emphasis 
ours) 
There were breaches on the part of the parties to 
the agreement, some of which were unavoidable at the 
inception of the project, but because this was a profit-
sharing agreement the exhibits show that each was 
making an effort to correct its own faults, make adjust-
ments for the breaches of others, and continue with the 
contract. Thus, the evidence justifies the court's finding 
that Cassady had within his control the means by which 
the entire project would have profited. Therefore, the 
short delay in the sales program during the first thirty-
day period was insubstantial and not the proximate 
cause of the loss at all, and the lower court so found. 
The lower court's Finding No. 20 is as follows: 
'
 c
 Felt did not breach its contractual obliga-
tions to Cassady or to Hartford in any substantial 
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manner and any differences between them were 
resolved by extensions of time granted to Cas-
sady Company, Inc. and by the Supplemental 
Agreement (PR6) between the parties entered 
into February 16, 1951." 
Hartford points out that Felt had an obligation to 
Cassady to pay according to the course of construction 
and that said obligation was not qualified as to recording 
mortgages, sales program, or any other consideration. 
I t neglects to point out that since this was a profit-
sharing agreement whereby the contractor, as well as 
the owner, hoped to achieve substantial ultimate gain, 
they were disposed to, and did in fact by their conduct, 
disregard inconsequential and rectifiable breaches and 
did continue with their contract. 
The period of delay in payments to Cassady, as 
demonstrated by Ex. H-32, a letter from Cassady to 
Felt, occurred very early in the project. The mortgage 
recording delays, however, were under control by the 
middle of September, 1950 (T. 348); by December, 1950, 
all loans had been closed and mortgages recorded so 
that the proceeds of all loans were available for disburse-
ment to Cassady as the work progressed (T. 66, T. 105-
6). Even under these admitted facts, Cassady still did 
not see fit thereafter to complete one of the one hundred 
homes. This was the very crux of the money problem. 
2. The Court's Finding That The Assignment Of The 
Miscellaneous Account Due Felt Was Not A Sub-
stantial Breach Of The Contracts Is Supported By 
The Evidence. 
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A real estate firm, known here as Wright-Wirthlin, 
sold the 100 lots under a commission contract with Felt. 
Felt contends that by reason of Cassady's default which 
resulted in the unavailability of funds from the project, 
it was unable to discharge the commission obligation to 
Wright-Wirthlin. After many calls to Prudential Fed-
eral (T. 86) and apparently after threatening Felt with 
court proceedings, Felt assigned its interest for security 
purposes only to Wright-Wirthlin (Ex. H-31). The only 
contention Hartford made that this assignment was a 
material breach of the contract was that it effected, in 
some unascertained way, a disability to enter into a 
modified contract whereby certain mortgage funds in the 
hands of Prudential would be applied to the project. A 
close reading of the transcript citations in Hartford 's 
brief will disclose that only one of the stockholders of 
Felt ever assented to the application of the funds to 
the construction project. I t seems extremely abstract 
to excuse Cassady's previous continuing and substantial 
breaches of the contract by a simple diversionary argu-
ment as to the executory application of funds by an 
agreement which was never executed. The court was 
of the opinion that this assignment by Felt was of no 
consequence when compared to Cassady's substantial 
and material breaches and this record certainly supports 
the conclusion of the lower court in this regard. 
3. Hartford Was Allotved An Offset For Felt's Failure 
To Provide A Power Connection To Cassady And 
The Finding By The Court That Felt's Failure To 
Supply Electrical Power Was Of No Consequence Is 
Supported By The Record. 
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One of the impressive things about Hartford's brief 
is the way it is "grabbing at s t r aws" to save itself from 
the judgment, one of the prime examples of which is the 
way it complains about the failure of Felt to supply 
the power to the project. Felt admits that power was 
unavailable when construction was commenced, but the 
record fully supports the finding of the lower court 
that such failure was of no consequence. Mr. B. D. Scott 
testified that at all times during the period of construc-
tion portable power generators were available for Cas-
sady to use on the project and Cassady did obtain a 
portable power generator to supply all of his power 
needs. (T. 313-314) In addition, the Court has allowed 
an offset for the small amounts expended by Cassady 
for this additional cost. (Felt E. 43) 
4. Hartford Alleges That Cassady Was Not Reimbursed 
For Extras But The Record Would Not Support The 
Award For Other Extras. 
The only extra found by the Court to be of any 
merit was the portable power generators previously 
discussed. The only other extras which Cassady tacitly 
complains of not being reimbursed for were all of such 
a nebulous nature as to not warrant discussion. Suffice 
it to say, that they were all required by the Veterans' 
Administration to meet the building requirements; that 
Cassady was fully informed of these requirements by 
reason of his construction experience prior to the time 
he signed the contracts; and that even under these 
circumstances Cassady still did not finish any of the 
homes to meet the requirements of the Veterans' Ad-
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ministration so that all parties could be saved from their 
damages. 
This whole line of counter accusations, arising as 
it does after suit is brought some years after the 
claimed breaches, recalls the language of Larsen v. 
Knight, 120 Utah 265, 233 P. 2d 365: 
" A party claiming a right ought not to appear 
to acquiesce in non-performance by the other 
party until the time has gone by for such per-
formance and then claim damages." 
POINT II . 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPRO-
MISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL ALLEGED 
PRIOR BREACHES OF CONTRACT BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
POINT I I I . 
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 
1951, COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED 
BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL. 
(Felt under these two foregoing points adopts the 
argument made by the able counsel for Prudential 
under their Points III and IV, and, in addition thereto, 
presents the following:) 
Felt deems it significant that Hartford has not in 
its appeal brief traversed the findings of the lower 
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court that its principal, Cassady, waived any alleged 
breaches of the plaintiffs; nor that Cassady and Hart-
ford compromised and settled all alleged contract 
breaches occurring prior to the Supplemental Agree-
ment of February 16, 1951; nor that Hartford was 
estopped by said agreement from denying such compro-
mise and settlement. It would seem admitted that these 
findings of the lower court are supported by adequate 
and competent evidence and would, therefore, fully 
justify an affirmation of the lower court's findings. 
The Supplemental Agreement, Exhibit PR6, was 
entered into by the parties as an amendment to their 
original contracts, Exhibits (PR2) and (PE8), in an 
attempt to rejuvenate the failing project. Cassady 
stated that his main purpose for executing this Supple-
mentary Agreement was to obtain additional time for 
completing his contract. (T. 253) At that time all the 
loans had been closed and mortgages recorded. (T. 105) 
Consequently, all of the money under the contracts 
would have been available at that time if Cassady wrould 
have then performed pursuant to the terms of all of the 
agreements. 
The Supplementary Agreement recited, inter alia: 
" WHEREAS, conditions have arisen whereby 
the parties deem it necessary and expedient to 
amend, modify, supplement and adjust certain 
provisions of the Primary Contract, and certain 
of the provisions of the Disbursing Contract, as 
amended by the supplemental agreement of Aug-
ust 22, 1950. 
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"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of 
the premises and of the mutual promises and 
agreements of the parties hereto and of the 
benefits to be mutually derived from the amend-
ments, modification and adjustment of the afore-
said contracts, the parties agree hereto as 
follows: 
ARTICLE I I I 
" 3 . CASSADY hereby irrevocably admits 
that it has secured from SYNDICATE and 
ACCOUNTANTS an accounting of the pro-
ceeds of all funds paid by PRUDENTIAL to 
ACCOUNTANTS. CASSADY, PRUDEN-
TIAL and SYNDICATE each do hereby con-
firm and approve all of said disbursements by 
ACCOUNTANTS to the date hereof. 
ARTICLE IV 
" 2 . SYNDICATE, CASSADY and AC-
COUNTANTS hereby irrevocably admit that 
they, and each of them, have secured from 
PRUDENTIAL an accounting of the proceeds 
of all mortgage loans and down payments and 
the disbursal of same by PRUDENTIAL to 
the date hereof. SYNDICATE, CASSADY 
and ACCOUNTANTS do each hereby confirm 
and approve all of said disbursements by 
PRUDENTIAL to the date hereof, and do 
hereby admit, agree and declare that PRU-
DENTIAL has performed all of its obligations 
under said Primary Contract and Disbursing 
Contract and supplement thereto dated the 
22nd day of August, 1950, from the respective 
dates thereof to the date of this Supplemental 
Agreement." 
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This agreement irrefutably establishes a complete 
acceptance and acquittal of the payment theretofore 
made to Cassady from the project and directly points to 
the fact that it was Cassady who thereafter failed to 
perform. 
On the issue of waiver and estoppel we cite to the 
Court the following authorities: 
Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 300; 
25 Am. Jur. 653; 
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins Co. of Ports-
mouth, et al., Utah, 120 Utah 109, 232 Pac. 2d. 
754; 
Larson v. Knight, 120 Utah 265, 233 Pac. 2d 365; 
Sprague v. Boyle's Brothers Drilling Co., 4 Utah 
2d 344, 294 Pac. 2d 689. 
By the agreement of February 16, 1951, Cassady 
was given an extension of time until June 1, 1951, to 
complete the homes which under the agreement of July 
19, 1950, should have been finished before January, 1951. 
It is significant that in this agreement Cassady made 
no claim for extras and no claim of any damages by 
reason of any alleged prior breaches by Felt. He did 
not ask for any construction cost adjustment. Cassady 
needed more time to finish the houses and Felt was 
willing to give Cassady additional time. Certainly 
neither Cassady nor Hartford should be permitted to 
alter or vary the terms of the supplemental agreement 
(Ex. Pr. 6) by making claims now which were not 
deemed sufficiently important to assert at that time. 
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Indeed the modifying agreement (Ex. Pr . 6) expressly 
provided: 
" A R T I C L E IV, PAGE 6 
"This Supplemental Agreement shall be and 
become effective from the date hereof upon the 
approval thereof by Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
Company and Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company and upon becoming effective shall not 
modify, amend or affect the provisions of the 
Primary Contract, Construction Contract, Dis-
bursing Contract and supplement thereto dated 
August 22, 1950, except as herein specifically 
provided." 
Notwithstanding this provision, counsel for Hart-
ford, asserting no breaches of the February 16, 1951, 
agreement, now desires to rewrite it and include in it 
claims for self-styled " e x t r a s " , prior breaches, and 
immunity from subsequent breaches by Cassady. 
I t was not claimed nor proved in the evidence by 
Hartford that there were any breaches of the agreement 
by Felt which occurred subsequent to this agreement of 
February 16, 1951, nor did they claim any subsequent 
breaches by Prudential. 
POINT IV. 
FAILURE TO PAY FRANCHISE TAXES AFTER A 
FOREIGN CORPORATION CEASES TO DO BUSINESS 
IN UTAH WILL NOT BAR IT FROM THEREAFTER 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION IN UTAH COURTS. 
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Hartford contends that Felt 's right to maintain 
this action was forfeited by the provisions of Section 
59-13-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, which reads as follows: 
" I f a tax computed and levied hereunder 
(Corporate Franchise Act) is not paid before 
five o'clock P.M. on the last day of the eleventh 
month after the date of delinquency, the corpor-
ate powers, rights and privileges of the delin-
quent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, 
shall be suspended, and if a foreign corporation, 
it shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do intra-
state business in this state." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
Hartford 's counsel, by two identical motions, urged 
their position in this matter in the lower court. One 
motion was heard before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, 
J r . and the other motion was heard at pretrial before 
the Honorable A. H. Ellett. Both motions were denied. 
Counsel for Hartford contend that the words in the 
statute "forfeit its right to do intrastate business in 
this s t a t e " encompass all corporate rights, including 
the right to maintain this action. Felt, on the other hand, 
contends that the quoted words can only be construed 
to forfeit Felt 's rights to do "intrastate business," and 
cannot be construed to disable Felt from maintaining 
this lawsuit. 
Felt was incorporated in and pursuant to the laws 
of the State of Nevada and was duly qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah on March 28, 1950. This 
qualification antedated all of the contracts and agree-
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ments with which we are here concerned. There is no 
question presented in this record, nor by Hartford, that 
Felt was not at all times duly and regularly qualified 
and franchised to participate in business activity within 
the State of Utah during the construction of Morning-
side Heights Subdivision; at the time the agreements 
in evidence were executed; and at the time the sales of 
the various lots were made. Felt concedes that it did 
not pay a franchise tax after it ceased to conduct intra-
state business in Utah and that its right to do an intra-
state business was forfeited on September 22, 1952. 
An inspection of Section 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953, sets 
forth in clear and unambiguous terms what is forfeited 
by a foreign corporation when it does not pay a fran-
chise tax. The statute specifically provides that only 
"the right to do intrastate business" is forfeited. It 
does not say, as contended by counsel for Hartford, that 
its charter is revoked, nor does it say that its existence 
is ended. The statute merely states that the foreign 
corporation's right to do intrastate business in Utah is 
forfeited. We thus see that if maintaining a lawsuit is 
excluded from the phrase " intrastate business," Felt 
still does and at all times herein mentioned did possess 
the right to maintain this action in the State of Utah. 
The words " intrastate business" have been defined 
quite clearly by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
In the case of George R. Barse Live Stock Company v. 
The Range Valley Cattle Company and J . M. Dart, 16 
Utah 59, 65, the court said: 
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" . . . ' to do business,' as defined by Webster, 
is ' to carry on any particular occupation or em-
ployment for a livelihood or gain, as agriculture, 
trade, mechanic arts, or profession; that which 
busies or occupies the time, attention, or labor of 
one.' The statute applies to foreign corporations. 
The constitution applies to all corporations. In 
our opinion, the constitution, when reasonably 
construed, was intended to prohibit corporations 
from transacting their ordinary corporate busi-
ness within the state without first complying with 
its terms, and having one or more places of busi-
ness, with an authorized resident agent upon 
whom process could be served in cases of litiga-
tion between them and citizens of the state, and 
to protect citizens of the state against fraud and 
imposition by insolvent and unrealiable corpora-
tions, and place them in a position to be reached 
by the legal process of the courts of the state, 
and was not designed or intended to prohibit the 
doing of one single act of business by such cor-
poration, with no apparent intention to do any 
other act, or to engage in corporate business. 
The bringing of a suit by a foreign corporation to 
secure its legal rights, under the circumstances 
shown in this case, is not (doing business/ within 
the constitution or laws of this state." (Empha-
sis supplied) 
An outstanding review of the authorities was made by 
the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Marchant v. 
National Reserve Co. of America, 137 P. 2d 331, 338, 
and the court therein quoted from the Barse Live Stock 
case,, supra, with approval. The court therein stated: 
" T o summarize, then, the law may be stated 
to be, from the foregoing decisions, that to be 
1
 doing business' in a state, a corporation must be 
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engaged in a continuing course of business, rather 
than a few isolated transactions, whether those 
transactions are within the usual scope of that 
corporation's business or not. There must be at 
least some permanence about the presence and 
business transactions of the corporation within 
the s ta te ." 
The foregoing cases have not been overruled by this 
court. It, therefore, seems settled in Utah that a foreign 
corporation is not doing " intras ta te business" in Utah 
merely by bringing an action in the courts of Utah to 
enforce its rights. 
We have reviewed the cases cited by Hartford in 
its brief, consisting of Aalwyn's Law Institute v. Mar-
tin, 159 P. 158 (Cal.); U. 8. F. & G. Co. v. Matthews, 274 
P. 769; Reed v. Norman, 302 P. 2d 690; and Liebson v. 
Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. 2d 310. We respectfully 
submit that none of those cases involved a fact situation 
similar to the case at bar. Each of those cases concerned 
substantially different statutory provisions and only in-
volved domestic corporations. 
I t follows that the lower court correctly denied 
Hartford 's motion each time it was made. 
CONCLUSION 
In its brief Hartford has avoided the well-estab-
lished rule applicable to appellate review and has argued 
against matters determined by the lower court which are 
fully substantiated by the evidence. Felt met its burden 
of proof in the lower court, and the record supports the 
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findings and conclusions that material and substantial 
breaches by Cassady were the proximate cause of the 
damages sustained by all the plaintiffs, including Felt. 
Hartford, in consideration of a substantial premium, 
guaranteed the performance by Cassady. Hartford has 
conceded that Cassady altogether failed to perform. He 
did not complete one house of the one hundred. Funds 
that were payable to Felt on the miscellaneous account 
and on the profit account were used to complete the 
project. Hartford in justice and in all good conscience 
should have performed on its bond instead of joining 
Cassady in default. 
For reasons set forth in this brief, it is further clear 
that the lower court erred in excluding the portion of 
the miscellaneous account due Felt in computing its 
judgment; and the amount of $14,761.80 plus interest 
from the date of default should be added to the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. W H I T E and 
C. PRESTON ALLEN, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Felt Syndicate, Inc. 
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